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Abstract 
As with global warming, so with financial crises – externalities have a lot to answer for. We 
look at three of them. First the financial accelerator due to ‘fire sales’ of collateral assets -- a 
form of pecuniary externality that leads to liquidity being undervalued. Second the ‘risk-
shifting’ behaviour of highly-levered financial institutions who keep the upside of risky 
investment while passing the downside to others thanks to limited liability. Finally, the 
network externality where the structure of the financial industry helps propagate shocks 
around the system unless this is checked by some form of circuit breaker, or ‘ring-fence’.  
 The contrast between crisis-induced Great Recession and its aftermath of slow growth  in the 
West and the rapid - and (so far) sustained - growth in the East suggests that successful 
economic progress may depend on how well these externalities are managed. 
Key words: Externalities, financial accelerator, limited liability, risk-shifting, global 
imbalances, financial networks 
JEL classifications: F41, G01, G18, G21 
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Introduction 
The Pareto-efficiency of competitive economic equilibrium is, of course, a central feature of 
the Arrow-Debreu paradigm. But in 1986 two papers appeared concerning the welfare 
inefficiency of competitive equilibria.  Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis showed that ‘missing 
markets’ implied the possibility of Pareto-improving interventions; while Greenwald and 
Stiglitz demonstrated that missing markets and asymmetric information implied that 
competitive market prices could generate ‘pecuniary externalities’ -- with market prices 
generating side-effects conceptually similar to technological externalities (such as the 
productive interactions of Silicon Valley or the negative effects of industrial pollution). 
Historical events were soon to lead to a much greater reliance on market forces world-wide, 
however.  The break-up of the USSR signalled the collapse of the Communist challenge to 
market-oriented models of economic development and encouraged a shift from managed 
capitalism to market capitalism - with the administrations of Mrs Thatcher and President 
Ronald Reagan in the vanguard. In the UK, for instance, there was widespread privatisation 
of nationalised industries and the stock of housing; and, in financial services, the Big Bang of 
1986 signalled the opening up of the City of London to the forces of global competition. 
Likewise in the USA -- where Government intervention was increasingly seen as ‘part of the 
problem not the solution’ -- there was pressure to deregulate financial services; and the 
success of Mr Greenspan in handling the US stock market break on Black Monday in 1987 
encouraged the belief that self-regulation plus adept interest rate management could head off 
financial crisis. 
New York and London being world-leading financial centres competing for global business, 
this triggered a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ -- with reliance on self-regulation on one side 
of the Atlantic matched by ‘light touch’ regulation on the other2. Over time this led on to 
repeal of the Glass Steagall legislation in the USA; and to such a rapid  expansion of UK 
                                                          
2
 Substantial losses suffered by US banks on Latin American lending in the 1980s did, however, lead 
to cooperation in searching for internationally accepted baselines for prudential regulation. The result 
wa the Basel Accord of 1988, setting a minimum capital requirement of 8% of total risk-weighted 
assets on individual banks, which led to a substantial recapitalisation of the international banking 
sector. 
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banking that at the peak it was host to an industry with a balance sheet more than five times 
local GDP! 
What then of the early warnings from 1986? They seemed to be largely forgotten. Even when 
severe financial crisis erupted in East Asia in 1997/8, this was widely seen as a symptom of 
nascent capitalism -- of poorly regulated banks, connected lending and excessive foreign 
currency exposure -- to be solved by upgrading financial regulation to the exemplary 
standards of the leading economies in the West. The IMF did put to one side its plans for 
increased deregulation of the capital account
3
; but faith in the efficacy of lightly-regulated 
markets in advanced economies was largely unshaken. Indeed the assumption of financial 
market efficiency was to become the hall-mark of macroeconomic models used by central 
banks to steer the economy in the time of Great Moderation. Even when markets departed 
from fundamentals, as in the US ‘high-tech’ bubble which characterised the early years of the 
21
st
 century, interest rate policy on its own seemed adequate for handling the consequences of 
the asset price correction, Greenspan (2002). 
 
But the financial crisis in North Atlantic economies in 2007/8 -- and the threat it posed of 
collapse for the Western financial system and a possible repeat of the Great Depression - has 
forced a reconsideration of consensus, with Mr Greenspan himself acknowledging that his 
faith in the efficiency of market forces had been misplaced. 
 
Do financial crises provide concrete examples of financial externalities in action?  A recent 
empirical study by Majnoni and Powell (2011) using quarterly data for 139 corporate issues 
from the period 1999-2006 suggests that -- at least for emerging markets - they have. They 
test the hypothesis that corporate spreads will normally be determined by firm, country and 
international financial characteristics; but in addition they will rise at times of crisis due to 
endogenous risk or amplification effects. Their empirical results show an amplification of 
shocks during crisis times depending on the size of the credit market before the crisis. For 
                                                          
3 Just before the East Asian crisis, the IMF had been planning to change the Articles of Agreement so 
as to remove the sovereign right of members to impose capital controls, Fischer (2004). 
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banking crises in particular, the weakness of the banking system amplifies shocks by 
increasing the cost of capital for non-financial firms.
4
 
 
What are the nature of these externalities? How to reshape the rules and structure of banking 
world-wide to limit them?  How likely are these reforms to be effected? These are the issues 
to be explored in this paper. In the first section we look at fire-sale externalities and the 
under-provision of liquidity; in the second section we look at the risk-shifting due to limited 
liability; finally in section three at the risk of contagion posed by the network feature of 
banking.  
In conclusion, we note how vividly the shock to the Western economies – now mired in 
recession with the prospect of years of slow growth to come - contrasts with the success of 
managed capitalism of India and China both in avoiding these crises and in maintaining 
enviable rates of economic growth. The capacity of an economic system to limit pecuniary 
externalities may, it seems, be an important determinant of capitalist development. 
 
1. Fire-sales and the under-provision of liquidity 
 
The ‘financial accelerator’ as pecuniary externality 
 
Even without financial intermediaries, a credit-constrained market economy – where 
collateral is used to handle repudiation risk – can exhibit liquidity crises and collapsing asset 
prices. In the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), for example,  productive small business 
entrepreneurs wish to raise outside finance to acquire the fixed capital assets but face an 
agency problem because the  ‘human capital’ used in the business is inalienable. Recourse is 
had to the issuance of debt backed by physical collateral, priced to reflect its productivity 
outside the entrepreneurial sector (i.e. in the hands of the ‘deep pocket’ lenders). In the face 
of uncorrelated, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, agents adversely affected can sell capital 
and pay down debt without affecting asset prices. But in the face of an adverse 
macroeconomic shock to entrepreneurial productivity, the borrowing constraint can lead to  
‘fire-sales’ which affect the price of the collateral and trigger yet further sales, i.e. there is a 
pecuniary externality. 
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 For advanced economies, Barrell et al (2010) show how the probability of the crisis can be explained 
by inadequate levels of capital and liquidity. 
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This is in sharp contrast to the ‘first best’ economy where all agents are unconstrained in the 
credit market, and prices and production are unaffected by net worth. How this externality 
can impact on the allocation of fixed asset in the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) can be 
seen schematically in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The financial accelerator as pecuniary externality (Source: Miller and Stiglitz, 2010) 
From equilibrium at E, where debt-financed Small Businesses entrepreneurs hold a stock k* 
of fixed assets at price q*, the immediate impact of an adverse productivity shock is indicated 
by the ‘initial condition’ labelled DD -- a schedule for their disposal of fixed assets, k, as 
needed to match the  fall in net worth due to a one-period drop in productivity. This schedule 
can be interpreted as an unexpected need for liquidity on their part, Krishnamurthy (2009). 
From this perspective, asset prices have to fall until, at point X, the balance-sheet-driven 
‘demand for liquidity’ by Small Businesses (measured to the left from k* to DD) is matched by 
the ‘supply of liquidity’ by the residual buyers who have no balance sheet problems (the agents 
with ‘deep pockets’) whose take-up of assets is measured from k* to the schedule labelled SS. 
As the figure shows, the impact on asset holding has two components. The distance EA 
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indicates how far Small Businesses need to contract their holdings at a constant price, q*, as 
they dispose of assets to reduce their borrowing in line with the fall in net worth
5
; the second 
component, AX, indicates the need for further disposals due to the adverse net worth effects 
of asset prices falling in the face of concerted selling by small businesses to residual buyers 
with declining marginal productivity -- net worth effects that are exacerbated by expected 
persistence. In the absence of fresh shocks, the system will gradually return to equilibrium 
along the stable path
6
 SS. Thus the pecuniary externality acts as a ‘financial accelerator’ that 
takes short-run equilibrium from A to point X on SS.  
 
Like Gai et al. (2008), Korinek (2011) modifies this framework so that the borrowing is done 
by financial intermediaries, risk-neutral bankers who raise finance from households and 
invest in risky projects; and he shows how the externality involved can be thought of in terms 
their undervaluation of liquidity. Banks who think that in adverse conditions they can sell 
assets fail to realise that with correlated shocks these sales will help push prices down. A 
social planner would anticipate the fall and take on less risk, as he explains: 
 
A planner internalizes the fact that a decline in asset prices leads to financial amplification 
since it reduces the amount of liquidity that bankers can raise from their sales of each unit of 
the assets. This pecuniary externality reduces the efficiency of the distribution of capital. By 
contrast, decentralized bankers take asset prices as given since they realize that the behaviour of 
an atomistic agent has only an infinitesimal effect on asset prices.  
  
Central bankers and regulators have not generally been acting like social planners it seems. 
According to Majnoni and Powell (2011) ‘policy makers in the developed world (albeit with 
notable exceptions)  allowed financial institutions to push leverage up to unprecedented limits 
under a shared optimism regarding the capacity of capital markets to supply an almost infinite 
amount of liquidity’.  
 
 The difference between the private valuation and the planner’s social valuation of liquidity, 
as shown in Fig. 2 , is defined as the pecuniary externality (which falls to  zero in 
unconstrained states). For social efficiency, Korinek (2011) proposes a state-contingent, 
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 This would have little welfare significance if the user cost of capital – its productivity in the hands of 
the residual buyers -- were constant.  
6
 In their discussion of amplification through balance sheets and asset prices, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
assume that the ‘overshooting’ will not be severe enough to render the illiquid agents insolvent. 
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proportional tax on risk-taking that brings the private cost in line with the social cost. This is 
a metaphor for macro-prudential regulation as “it closely captures what BIS defines as the 
macro-prudential approach to regulation: it is designed to limit system-wide financial distress 
that stems from the correlated exposure of financial institutions and to avoid the resulting real 
losses in the economy” (p.26).  He also proposes taxation on complex securities such as a 
CDS swap “which is likely to require large payouts precisely in times of financial turmoil” (p. 
27).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Private and Social Valuation of Liquidity (Source: Korinek, 2011) 
While these policy measures are expressed in terms of taxes on externalities, Korinek argues 
that they are broadly equivalent to capital adequacy requirements “which have tax-like effects 
because bank capital is costly” (p28). Such capital requirements could be reduced if CDS 
swaps can be arranged ‘that shift systemic risk to agents outside the financial system who are 
not subject to financial constraint’. (A deal between US banks and Chinese sovereign wealth 
fund to deliver liquidity in the crisis, for example?) 
 
This welfare perspective seems to match that of Stiglitz (2010) when he argues that: 
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‘The financial sector has imposed huge externalities on the rest of society. America’s 
financial industry polluted the world with toxic mortgages, and, in line with the well 
established “polluter pays” principle, taxes should be imposed on it. Besides, well-
designed taxes on the financial sector might help alleviate problems caused by 
excessive leverage and banks that are too big to fail. Taxes on speculative activity 
might encourage banks to focus greater attention on performing their key societal role 
of providing credit.’  
 
Risk of insolvency especially after collapse of asset bubble 
In the discussing the amplification shocks through balance sheets and asset prices, it is 
customary to assume that the ‘overshooting’ will not be severe enough to render the illiquid 
agents insolvent, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krishnamurthy (2010) and Korinek (2011). This 
is a rashly optimistic assumption in the aftermath of an asset bubble -- especially if highly 
levered institutions are involved -- as is suggested in Figure 1 where the disposal schedule D'D' 
associated with an asset bubble fails to intersect SS to the right of SC, the Solvency Constraint. 
In Japan, for example, Koo (2008, pp. 14-15) reports that de-leveraging made many firms 
technically insolvent after the bubble burst. In the recent North Atlantic crisis, Lehman 
Brothers famously went bankrupt and Fanny May and Freddie Mac were nationalised soon 
afterwards -- as were two mortgage banks in the UK. In both countries rescue plans for the 
financial sector also included substantial injections of equity capital for financial institutions
7
. 
How the existence of limited liability may induce firms to run the risk of insolvency -- and 
how this can lead to an asset bubble - is the subject of the next section. 
 
2. Risk-shifting and under-provision of capital 
In Casino Capitalism, Hans Werner Sinn notes how the limited liability corporation was and 
is crucial for the mobilisation of savings to fund risky investment, as the limitation of liability 
is needed to convince the small shareholder to participate. While this corporate form may be 
‘capitalism’s secret of success’, it can be misused by taking on massive leverage, which 
generates negative externalities in the form of excessive risk-taking whose downside is borne 
by the creditors. The case of US investment banks is cited as a case in point: 
Investment banks, until well into the 1970s, were all organized as partnerships, and as 
such offered their market partners the unlimited private liability of their owners. But 
                                                          
7
 Further detail available in Alessandri and Haldane (2009),  Miller and Stiglitz (2009) and Sinn (2010). 
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they evolved eventually into corporations in order to limit their liability to their equity 
capital. … For the five big American investment banks in 2006, before the financial 
crisis erupted, business volume was leveraged by a factor of 22 to 33 of what would 
have been possible if only equity had been lent. (pp. 76-77) 
If a business volume of 100 units of money is only backed by three to four-and a-half 
units of equity, it can easily happen that in times of crises the losses eat up the equity 
and lead to bankruptcy. Even worse was the fact that the low level of equity combined 
with limited liability induced the stockholders to demand ever riskier business models 
in order to increase their profits. … If some of the losses are borne by the creditors, it 
pays to take the risk. (p.79)  
It is the negative externality that bankers impose on their creditors and possibly the 
taxpayer that induces excessive risk-taking, producing private profits and social 
losses.(p.81) 
This same logic is explored in a piece written about emerging markets by Allen and Gale 
(2000) (see also Allen and Gale, 2007, Chapter 9). But they go further and show how the 
incentive for highly levered institutions to shift risk on to their creditors can have the effect of 
raising asset prices above the fundamental level
8
, i.e. create a ‘bubble’, adding further to the 
vulnerability of the financial system. 
In this section, risk-shifting incentives are presented in the context of a simple two bloc 
global model, designed to show how financial externalities, weak regulation and missing 
markets can expose the global economy to the risk of crisis. First we discuss how limited 
liability and weak regulation of financial intermediaries can lead to an asset price bubble in 
the Home country; then we look at how precautionary motive in the Foreign country (which 
saves because of an absence of insurance) can further inflate the asset price in the Home 
country. 
2.1 Limited liability and excessive leverage 
To formalise the argument we adapt Allen and Gale (2000) model study asset pricing in the 
Home country (which, in the light of Sinn’s comments, could be thought of as the US). 
Assume there are two periods and there are two assets are available in the Home country: a 
safe asset with variable supply and a risky one in fixed supply of 1. The gross return on the 
safe asset in period 2 is R  ( 1R ) and that on the risky asset is 
HR  with probability  and 
LR  with probability 1 .  
                                                          
8
 Prices that would be established without leverage. 
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The investment in the risky asset has to be done through financial intermediation (e.g., risk 
neutral banks) which is perfectly competitive. In the absence of adverse incentives in the 
intermediation sector, the equilibrium price of the risky asset in period 1 must satisfy: 
R
P
R
P
R
F
L
F
H )1(          (1) 
where 
FP  represents the fundamental price of the risky asset, i.e.,  
R
RR
P LHF
)1(
.         (2) 
For each unit investment in the risky asset, an intermediary is required to finance a fraction 
k  by issuing equity and borrows the rest from the market at a cost of R . (So k/1  indicates 
the leverage of the intermediary.) Let k  be set by a regulatory authority, where a low value 
of k  indicates weak regulation of financial intermediaries. Assume specifically that 
F
LH
P
RR
k
)(
         (3) 
i.e. k is set too low to prevent  risk-shifting behaviour on the part of the financial 
intermediaries.  
If all intermediaries are protected by limited liability, then perfect competition implies 
0))(1()( kR
P
RH
       (4) 
where P  indicates equilibrium price for the risky asset with financial intermediation. For 
simplicity, we assume that the cost of the intermediary's own capital is R . So, the first term 
on the right hand side of (4) represents the payoff to the intermediary in the good state, and 
the second the payoff in the bad state. Note that, given (3), the realisation of the bad state 
implies that the debt will not be paid in full since RkPRL )1(/ . In this case, the liability 
will be taken over by an insuring agency, and the intermediary will be closed down and lose 
its own capital, k .  
Solving for P  in (4) yields 
kR
R
P H
)1(
         (5) 
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and together with (3) this implies,  
FPP  
i.e., weak regulation leads to asset price bubbles. 
 
Let 
FPPkR /),(  represent the relative size of the bubble, then from (2) and (5), one finds 
0/),( RkRR          (6) 
and 
0/),( kkRk          (7) 
i.e., a higher interest rate R reduces the demand for the risky asset, dampening its price rise; 
while weaker regulation (lower k ) increases intermediaries' incentive to shift risk and so 
pushes up the price of the risky asset. 
As long as households are not aware of the risk-shifting incentives that exist in the financial 
intermediaries, they will treat the bubble as if it is an increase in their real wealth, as in 
Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010). In the next section, we look at the global impact of this 
agency problem. 
 
2.2 Missing insurance markets and precautionary saving 
Let the global exchange economy consist of two countries -- Home and Foreign -- and last 
two periods. Only non-state-contingent assets can be traded between Home and Foreign. 
Each country is populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical consumers with preferences 
over consumption in periods 1 and 2, 
1C  and 2C  respectively (with * indicates variables for 
the Foreign country), given by standard additively separable utility function which has a 
Constant Relative Risk Averse. 
Assume there is no uncertainty in the first period and both countries are endowed with 1 unit 
of the single tradable commodity. . To reflect a higher incidence of macroeconomic shocks in 
the Foreign country, let two possible states of nature exist in the Foreign country, in period 2, 
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with probability of 1  and  respectively, where  is the probability of a low state. 
Specifically we assume the state-dependent aggregate growth rate of its endowments is gˆ  in 
the high state and gˆ  in the low state, giving Foreign's period 2 endowment as gˆ1  and 
gˆ1  respectively. 
Assume also that consumers in the Foreign country are identical ex-ante but, in period 2, they 
are divided into two groups. The first group, with a measure of 1 , is unaffected by the 
aggregate shock and enjoys the same endowment in either state. The second group, with a 
measure of , suffers the full brunt of the aggregate shock in the low state, so their 
endowment is disproportionally reduced to /ˆ1 g  in the low state.
9
 This formulation is 
based on Mankiw (1986) model of the concentration of aggregate shocks, and is intended to 
capture the lack of risk-pooling among residents of foreign country due to the absence of 
social safety net or the presence of private information and moral hazard considerations. 
Given the real global gross interest rate of R , the optimal allocation of consumption in the 
Foreign country implies its period 1 consumption ),(
*
1 RC  has the properties that: 
0/),(
*
1 RRC  and 0/),(
*
1 RC . The first property is because a rise in R , 
through both income and substitution effects, decreases period 1 consumption. The second is 
because higher risk concentration leads to higher precautionary saving in the Foreign country, 
reducing its period 1 consumption, as discussed in Miller et al (2010). 
Let the period 1 endowment of a consumer in the Home country's be 1, so period 2 resources 
will consist in an endowment of g1  and the returns on the investment he/she made through 
the financial intermediary in period 1. If consumers in the Home country are not aware of 
incentive problem in financial intermediaries, they would treat an increase in P  as an 
increase in their wealth. So the ex ante wealth for the Home consumers is 
)()1(1 1RgWH  
where 0)('  positive wealth effect of the bubble.  
 
                                                          
9
The lower is the value of , the higher is the degree of risk concentration. 
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For a given the real global gross interest rate R , the optimal allocation of consumption in the 
Home country implies period 1 consumption ),(1 RC  has the properties: 0/),(1 RRC  
and 0/),(1 RC . The reason for the first property is the same as that for the Foreign’s 
period 1 consumption. The second property simply reflects the fact that asset price bubbles 
have a positive wealth effect.  
 
To complete the model, we introduce the market-clearing condition for period 1 to determine 
the equilibrium global interest rate R : 
2),(),( 1
*
1 RCRC         (8) 
Using the properties of ),(1 RC  and ),(
*
1 RC  above, the equilibrium condition (8) implies 
the following comparative statics for the global interest rate: 
0
/),(/),(/),(
/),(
11
*
1
*
1
RCRRCRRC
RCR
R
   (9) 
0
/),(/),(/),(
/),(
11
*
1
1
RCRRCRRC
RC
k
R
R
k    (10) 
 
How excessive leverage and risk concentration can affect the pattern of consumption and 
global interest rates is illustrated with the aid of Figure 3, where the horizontal axis measures 
period 1 consumption and the vertical the global real interest rates. (Note that Home’s 
consumption is measured from point 
HO  and that of the Foreign country measured from FO .) 
In the absence of asset price bubble ( 1) and the risk concentration ( 1), the 
equilibrium is at point A  where the two demand schedules of the Home and the Foreign 
intersect. Note that allocation at point A is only ‘constrained efficient’ because the global 
asset markets are incomplete: full efficiency would require Arrow securities or GDP linked 
bonds. 
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Figure 3. Risk concentration, excessive leverage and global imbalances 
 
Limited liability, weak regulation and excessive leverage leading to an asset bubble shift 
Home’s demand schedule up to )1,(1 RC  reflecting the increased wealth perceived by 
Home consumers, as in Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010). The presence of risk concentration, 
on the other hand, shifts Foreign’s demand schedule down to )1,(
*
1 RC  due to 
precautionary savings. Global market-clearing equilibrium with risk concentration and 
excessive leverage is given by point B where the two revised demand schedules intersect. 
With appropriate choice of  and , substantial global imbalances will emerge with little 
changes of real interest rates.  
By assumption, both externalities and missing markets play a role in defining this equilibrium 
-- a situation of excessive, bubble-driven consumption in one country and high precautionary 
savings in the other. Welfare-improving policy interventions would involve tightening 
regulation in the Home country (increasing k) and providing a social safety net in the Foreign 
country (increasing ). With and k above the critical value shown in (3) above, 
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equilibrium would be at A. (Welfare improvement from A would require completing the 
global asset market, e.g. by the issuance of GDP bonds.) 
3. Network externalities, contagion and circuit breakers 
Liquidity and solvency problems have been studied in previous sections without considering 
the pattern of interconnectedness between agents --. by assuming, so to say, a representative 
bank. This could be defended from a reductionist perspective – why look at structure unless 
you have to? It has been found however, that industry structure is key for contagion: research 
at the Bank of England and the FRBNY using stochastic network theory shows that different 
structures can lead to very different propagation mechanisms.  
This is what we study in this section, beginning with a discussion of the special nature of 
banks - how it arises from asymmetric information and missing markets; and how it leads to 
institutional arrangements that call for a structural analysis. This is followed by a simplified 
model of the banking industry where risk-pooling encourages individual banks to consolidate 
into banking groups, but the risk of contagion inside any group sets a limit to efficient group 
size. If the activities that generate contagion can be hived off outside the banking industry, 
however, group size can expand indefinitely. This could be interpreted as an argument for 
Glass-Steagall type of separation of commercial and investment banking. It may also provide 
a rationale for the partial separation recommended by the UK Vickers Commission where 
investment and commercial banking activities can remain within the same corporate entity 
but are separated by a “ring-fence”.  
Liquidity Provision 
Taking the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model as a benchmark, the problem facing agents 
wishing to invest long term subject to random liquidity needs is imperfect markets for 
liquidity insurance. The tension between long term investment and need for cash can be 
reduced by trading in the non-contingent spot markets – what Allen and Gale call the market 
solution. But,  as they show,  banks can achieve Pareto improvement by pooling of liquidity 
risks using the law of large numbers. This banking solution is however, subject to a 
coordination problem in that fears of depositor flight can lead to a bank run. Even without 
bank runs, there is an obvious risk that the law of large numbers --- while it applies across 
banks --- does not apply to any individual bank or those in a region.  Hence the emergence of 
interbank markets to pool liquidity.  
 15 
 
 
But, as the sub-prime crisis has made clear, these interbank markets - where short-term 
lending is not collateralized -  are themselves prone to seizure when fear of counterparty 
insolvency  stalks the streets. In the crisis of 2008-10, interbank lending effectively gravitated 
onto the balance sheet of  central banks: following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
liabilities of US Federal Reserve promptly  doubled while the balance-sheet of the Bank of 
England expanded three and half times.  
So banks that pool liquidity risk among their customers and interbank markets which 
economize on system wide liquidity are both prone to collapse. Network gains are subject to 
coordination failure. 
Contagious insolvency 
Similar issues arise with respect to insolvency.  In their stochastic network model of UK 
banks Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Gai et al (2010) find that an interconnected financial 
system of a large number of banks can fail if and when a shock hits affects a ‘super-spreader’ 
and is then dissipated widely around the system.  
Modelling how network structure can amplify shocks may be relevant for the analysis of the 
financial crisis, but in the view of Jon Danielsson (2010) a realistic ‘endogenous risk model is 
beyond our abilities’. In these circumstances, he argues that supervisors should focus their 
attention on where the risk is created rather than trying to measure it; and that the most 
important factor is resolution – i.e. the closure of systematically important financial 
institutions which have gambled and face failure. 
Another approach, as in Stiglitz (2011), is to simplify the structure sufficiently so as to 
achieve analytical tractability.  Using the electricity grid system as a metaphor, Stiglitz’s 
analysis involves production uncertainty where the risk of productivity shocks is insured by 
sharing costs between all the players. The result is a stylised model of endogenous risk, 
where the gains of connectivity have to be balanced against the risk of propagating large 
shocks around the system. By analogy with the electricity grid, the principal policy 
recommendation is the implementation of ‘circuit breakers’, designed to limit the propagation 
of large shocks. 
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To throw light on structural measures currently being taken to reduce the vulnerability of 
banking - both in terms of resolution procedures and of the ‘ring-fencing’ – a  simplified 
version of the Stiglitz model is provided in the Annex, with a trade-off between sharing small 
risks and avoiding large ones. Forming an interconnected group allows for risk-pooling, but it 
exposes group members to contagion from a large shock hitting any group member, so there 
is a limit to optimal group size. Given a ‘circuit breaker’ which prevents any contagion from 
a large shock, however, there is no limit to the size of the group. 
In an open economy context, Stiglitz (2011) suggests that such circuit breakers could be 
interpreted as restrictions on capital flows. Here we suggest that  a circuit breaker be 
interpreted as a metaphor for structural changes designed to limit the damage an insolvent 
Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) can impose on the wider banking system. 
This could include both resolution procedures, and ‘ring-fencing’ proposals. In the UK, for 
example, the Banking Act 2009 created a Special Resolution Regime (SRR)
10
, giving the 
authorities a framework for dealing promptly with distressed banks and building societies; 
and the Vickers Commission has recommended a ‘ring-fence’ for the retail banking 
operations of big universal banks so that it will be possible to let the riskier investment 
banking arms to fail without imperilling household savings and small business lending. 
 
Financial regulation: the state of play  
What is being done to check the impact of externalities in the financial sector since the crisis 
of 2008/10? The steps being taken involve first the regulation of individual bank portfolios in 
the form of rules governing capital adequacy and liquidity holdings; second changes to the 
structure of the industry; and finally macro-prudential interventions across the industry which 
varies with the business cycle.  
 A compact summary of the current state of play on the first two of these is provided by 
Barrell and Davis (2011): 
On Capital:  
The new regulations, which are basically complete, will raise common equity from the 
previous minimum of 1 per cent of risk-weighted assets to at least 4.5 per cent, and 
                                                          
10
 By, for example, transferring all or part of a bank to a private sector purchaser, or to a ‘bridge bank’ 
subsidiary of the Bank of England, or into temporary public ownership; or sending it to be wound up. 
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Tier 1 as a whole to 6 per cent. A conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted 
assets must also be built up with common equity, and if this is exhausted in a crisis then 
the bank will be wound up.   A minimum ratio of capital to total (unadjusted) assets of 
3 per cent must be held.  
 
There is provision for a countercyclical capital buffer of up to 2.5 per cent of risk-
weighted assets, which is to be imposed at the discretion of the regulators. The 
regulation of subsidiaries and capital market activities has been substantially tightened, 
including the introduction of stress-related benchmarks for trading book capital and 
counterparty credit risk.  
 
 
Table 1. Capital requirements. Source: Barrel and Davis (2011, p. F5). 
 
On Liquidity 
 
Two new regulations for liquidity risk are being introduced: first, a liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR) enforcing sufficient liquid assets to offset net cash outflows during a 30-
day period of stress; second, a net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which seeks to ensure a 
degree of maturity matching over a one-year horizon, including allowance for off-
balance sheet commitments. 
 
 
The Timetable  
Given the virulence of the crisis, plans for implementation of these reforms are 
extraordinarily protracted. As can be seen from the graphic of Cechetti et al. (2011), the 
build- up of the equity and the implementation of the liquidity standards is spread over a 
decade.  
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Source: Cechetti et al. (2011, p. R35) 
 
Implications for bank leverage  
Academic economists see the need for much tougher regulation than do the guardians of 
financial stability housed in Basel, as may be seen from the following table where the 
recommendation of  Admati et al (2010) in their evidence to the ICB - that capital  be 15% on 
total assets implying  leverage in single figures -  is shown in the last line.  
By contrast, the minimum capital requirement shown at the top of the table is the 7% baseline 
ratio of equity to risk weighted assets (RWA) of Basel III. As indicated in column 3, with risk 
weighted assets at half the balance sheet, the leverage for banks at the Basel III minimum 
could rise alarmingly close to 30.  
The second line of the table shows what  Barrel et al (2011) calculate as the level of capital 
necessary to reduce banking risk to acceptable levels - double the Basel requirements; and 
this is followed by what Miles et al. (2010) estimate is needed.  
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 Minimum Capital  Requirement Liquidity Other 
 % RWA % Total 
Assets 
Leverage 
(assuming 
50% RWA) 
  
Basel III 4.5 +2.5 = 7 
+ Cyclical  
   Buffer 
3.5     28 LCR, 
SFR 
Resolution 
      
“Double Basel” 
Barrell & Davis(2011) 
 
14         7    14    
      
Miles et al.(2010) 19  9.5        11   
      
ICB Final 
Report(2011) 
(Retail banking)* 
20       10      10  Ring- fencing 
      
Admati et al.(2010) n. a.       15         4   
      
Memo item      
Hedge Funds 
Alessandri and 
Haldane (2009) 
       30        3.33   
 
Table 2. Regulatory measures for capital, liquidity and structural separation 
 
Of crucial importance for the regulation of banking in the UK are the proposals of the 
Independent Commission for Banking established by the current coalition Government and  
chaired by Sir John Vickers.  In the Final Report, the Commissioners specifically recommend 
a ‘ring-fence’ to insulate vital banking services on which households and SMEs depend from 
problems elsewhere in the financial system. (Such a ‘ring-fence’ is similar to imposing ex 
ante circuit breakers, limiting the spread of systemic risks ex post.) Ring-fenced banks are 
required to have very substantial capital backing, roughly 10% of equity and 10 % of ‘Cocos’, 
bonds that convert to equity depending on market conditions.  
 
In addition, ring fenced banks are explicitly banned from providing a wide range of activities.  
The list of these Prohibited Services (given in Chapter 3, para 3.39 of the Report) includes:  
 any service which would result in a trading book asset; 
  any service which would result in a requirement to hold regulatory capital against 
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           market risk; 
 any service which results in an exposure to a non-ring-fenced bank or a non-bank 
           financial organisation,except those associated with the provision of payments 
          services where the regulator has deemed this appropriate; 
 the purchase or origination of derivatives or other contracts which would result in a 
           requirement to hold regulatory capital against counterparty credit risk; and 
 services relating to secondary markets activity including the purchase of loans or 
securities. 
Broadly speaking, these prohibitions would mean that wholesale/investment banking 
divisions of existing banks could not be placed within the ring-fence
11
; consequently, in 
quantitative terms, ring fenced banks would only be allowed to hold ‘between a sixth and a 
third of the total assets currently held by the UK banking sector’ ( ICB, para. 3.40). 
 
As the authors of the Report observe, in something of an understatement :  
A ring-fence of this kind would also have the benefit that ring-fenced banks would be 
more straightforward than some existing banking structures and thus easier to 
manage, monitor and regulate. (ICB, para. 3.40). 
 
Conclusion 
Given the pernicious externalities considered above -- and the accumulating evidence that 
they matter greatly in practice -- the plans under Basel III look seriously inadequate -- 
especially when compared with the decisive steps taken by the Roosevelt Administration in 
the 1930s. 
In Whither Socialism, Joseph Stiglitz suggested that Communist planning could not succeed 
because the information required for the top-down allocation of resources by planners was 
simply not available. Could information issues prove the Achilles heel of market liberalism in 
the West? What if banks use opaque financial products and limited liability to take on 
                                                          
11 With such a firewall, indeed, especially with improved resolution procedures, it is intended that  
“the investment arm could, in extreme circumstance, be liquidated efficiently and at no public 
expense while preserving the retail activities uninfected by bad investment banking assets” (ICB, 
2010, para 4.21).  
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excessive risk -- collecting the upside and shifting the downside to the taxpayer via bail-outs 
in times of crisis? Again and again! 
The various recommendations reported in Table 1 above suggest that it will take a good deal 
more than Basel III to ‘save Western capitalism from the capitalists’. Could the type of 
structural separation for UK banking recommended by the Vickers Commission – the ring-
fencing of retail activities with explicit prohibition of risky products and activities therein – 
turn out to be an effective update of Glass-Steagall for our times? 
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ANNEX 
 
Optimal risk sharing network with systemic risks 
Consider a very simple case of financial network formation. The motivation for connecting 
each node to an existing component is to insure against small idiosyncratic shocks. The 
whole network however, may be hit by some ‘macro shock’ which leads to the failure of 
large fraction of nodes. The interaction between these two effects may limit the extent of 
connectivity. In what follows, we first show the existence of such limit and then illustrate 
how by isolating the node hit by the large shock can increase the connectivity. 
As shown by Gai and Kapadia (2010), whether solvency shocks on a small fraction of nodes 
can lead to systemic risk depends on (1) where the shocks hit and (2) the network structure 
(degree distribution). To make the problem analytically tractable, we assume a very simple 
network structure: that there are a fraction of nodes which are completely connected, and the 
rest are isolated (as shown in Figure 1). If a solvency shock (a macro shock) hits an isolated 
node, only that node fails. If the solvency shock hits on a node in the component, the whole 
component fails. 
Assume N ex-ante identical nodes, each faced with two types of shock: 
(a) , small shock, could be shared by the network.  
(b) A large shock T occurs with probability p. So an individual node will get hit with 
probability p/N. 
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The shocks, , are iid random variables with bounded support and . The type of 
shock (b) is the solvency shock described above. To have clear-cut results, we further 
assume that shocks (a) and (b) are independent. 
To look at the incentive to form connections, we compare the expected utility for two types 
of typical nodes: isolated and in a component. 
1. An isolated node 
The expected utility at the node is given by: 
  (1) 
where u(.) is a standard increasing and strictly concave utility function, and E is an 
expectation operator. Here, we assume that . 
II. A node in a component 
 
In a partially connected network, consider an completely connected component of size n. The 
expected utility of a node in the component is: 
Figure 1. A partially connected network 
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            (2) 
In the completely connected component of size n, the idiosyncratic shocks are evenly shared. 
(It is clear that if n=1 the above becomes (1), the unconnected case.) 
Differentiating the above expected utility w.r.t. n yields 
    (3) 
The first term on the RHS of (3) represents the adverse effect of solvency shock on the 
component: the larger is the component, the more severe will be this adverse effect. The 
second term represents the positive effect of smoothing the idiosyncratic shock: this effect 
declines with the increase in n because of the concavity of the utility function. A trivial case 
is when : the negative effect dominates, no connection is formed.  
For some reasonable utility functions (or , it could be that the positive 
effect dominates if n is small while the negative effect dominates if n is large. In this case, the 
optimal network would be the one which maximises (2), as illustrated in Figure 2, so there is 
a limit to the optimal size of a group. 
Note that in a naturally formed network, an isolated node can make connections and a 
connected node can break its connections, so the network will have isolated components of 
size n*. In this case, the probability of systemic risk is .  
 26 
 
 
III. Circuit Breaker (withdrawal of node) 
In Gai and Kapadia (2010), the policy of isolating the node hit by a large shock was not 
examined, maybe because of difficulties associated with substantial cross-holdings of assets 
among banks. Side-stepping such issues, let us assume that the large shock is clearly 
identifiable. Assume that if a connected node is hit by the large shock, its connections to 
other nodes in a component are severed; then the expected utility of a member in an n-group 
with such kind of “circuit breaker” is:  
 
            (4) 
The above is an increasing function of n, so the optimal size of a group is N. 
1 
n 
Uc(n) 
Figure 2. Optimal network 
n* 
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The idea that by separating systemically important nodes could allow the network to benefit 
fully its risk sharing function is intuitive with the aid of simple structure considered. The real 
financial networks are rarely completely connected: they usually exhibit small world 
properties with fat-tail degree distribution and high clustering coefficient. These imply that 
there are some important financial hubs which are highly inter-connected – the so-called 
“super-spreaders”. Haldane (2009) and Haldane and May (2011) have argued that it is crucial 
to identify such “super-spreaders” and to impose appropriate regulatory measures (such as 
higher capital buffers) to reduce their adverse effect on the stability of the whole financial 
system. In the similar vein, Stiglitz (2011) suggested, in the context of global financial 
integration, the use of “circuit breaker” (through, e.g., the use of capital control) to separate 
the infected component from the rest of the system.  
As disc used in Conclusion, the Independent Commission on Banking, in Final Report (2011), 
advocates a structural approach to banking regulation: by ‘ring-fencing’ commercial banks 
from their investment arms, and subjecting them to limits on risk assets and different capital 
adequacy requirements. Could the ‘circuit breaker’ used in the simple model above be a 
metaphor for such ex ante structural separation?  
1 
n 
    
N 
Figure 3. Expected utility of a node with circuit breaker 
